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Abstract: India fell further behind the UK in terms of GDP per capita and overall 
labour productivity between the 1870s and the 1970s, but has been catching-up since. 
This paper offers a sectoral analysis of these trends. Comparative India/UK labour 
productivity in agriculture has declined continuously, and agriculture still accounts for 
around two-thirds of employment in India. Agriculture thus played a key role in 
India’s falling behind and has subsequently slowed down the process of catching up. 
Although there have been substantial fluctuations in comparative India/UK labour 
productivity in industry, this sector has exhibited no long run trend. The only sector to 
exhibit an upward trend in comparative India/UK labour productivity is services. 
India’s recent emergence as a dynamic service-led economy thus appears to have long 
historical roots. Although India has been characterised by relatively low levels of 
physical and human capital formation overall, its education provision has historically 
been unusually skewed towards secondary and tertiary levels. This has provided a 
limited supply of high productivity workers who have been employed predominantly 
in services. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the comparative productivity performance of India and the 
United Kingdom since the late nineteenth century. Although there are a number of 
existing studies of comparative productivity and income over this period for members 
of today’s rich-country convergence club, there are none comparing the experience of 
countries which have remained less developed with the experience of rich nations 
(Pilat, 1993; Broadberry, 1998; Broadberry and Irwin, 2007). However, to identify the 
forces making for economic success, it is also important to examine the experience of 
countries which have remained less developed and compare them with the experience 
of developed nations. An Anglo-Indian comparison is feasible because much 
statistical information was collected in India during the period of British rule before 
1947, in a form which is relatively easy to compare with Britain. The comparison is 
also made possible by the impressive reconstruction of the Indian historical national 
accounts by Sivasubramonian (2000).  
 
A second reason for making a long run comparative study of India is the 
recent emergence of India as a fast-growing tiger economy based on services rather 
than industry, in striking contrast to the case of China and other fast-growing Asian 
economies, where manufacturing has played a leading role (Bosworth and Collins, 
2008). In this paper, we ask to what extent this success in services has long historical 
roots, by breaking down aggregate economic performance on a sectoral basis. 
 
A third reason for examining long run comparative productivity performance 
between these two nations is provided by the recent debate over the timing of the 
Great Divergence of productivity and living standards between Europe and Asia. 
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Parthasarathi (1998) and Pomeranz (2000) have claimed that India and China, 
respectively, remained on the same development level as Britain in the late eighteenth 
century and fell behind only during the nineteenth century. However, this would be 
very difficult to reconcile with the evidence on comparative GDP per capita 
accumulated by Maddison (1995; 2003), which suggests that in 1870, Indian and 
Chinese living standards were little more than 15% of the UK level. This has led 
Frank (1998) to reject the Maddison data in favour of alternative estimates by Bairoch 
(1981), which show “future developed countries” and “future third world countries” 
on a par at the end of the eighteenth century. Both Maddison (2003) and Bairoch 
(1981) obtain their estimates of comparative GDP per capita by projecting backwards 
from a recent benchmark year, using national time series of GDP and population for 
many countries. Recent debates have suggested the need for additional benchmarks in 
earlier years, to provide cross-sectional checks on the time series projections (Ward 
and Devereux, 2003; 2004; Broadberry, 2003). This paper provides some earlier 
benchmark evidence for the India/UK case that is consistent with the Maddison 
(2001) projections, and therefore supportive of Broadberry and Gupta’s (2006) case 
for an early modern Great Divergence. 
 
 The comparative labour productivity performance can be summarised as 
follows. Between 1870 and 1970, output per worker in India fell from around 15 per 
cent of the UK level in the economy as a whole to less than 10 per cent, as India fell 
further behind. Since the 1970s, India has begun to catch up on the United Kingdom, 
but by the end of the twentieth century was still further behind than in the early 1870s. 
Looking at the sectoral aspects of this relative decline, it is clear that agriculture lies at 
the heart of India’s productivity problem. Whereas in 1870 Indian labour productivity 
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in agriculture was more than 10 per cent of the UK level, by 1999/2000 this had fallen 
to around 1 per cent. In industry, comparative India/UK labour productivity has been 
stationary, with India returning to around 15 per cent of the UK level, although there 
have also been substantial periods of deviation from this long run level. In services, 
there has been a trend improvement of India’s comparative labour productivity 
position from around 15 per cent of the UK level in the late nineteenth century to 
around 30 per cent by the late twentieth century. Since agriculture accounted for 
around three-quarters of the Indian labour force between the 1870s and the 1970s, and 
still 65 per cent at the end of the twentieth century, it is clear that India needs to 
drastically increase agricultural labour productivity if it is to improve its overall 
productivity performance. The sectoral results also suggest that India’s recent 
experience of service-led growth has long historical roots (Bosworth and Collins, 
2008). 
 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets out the basic data sources and 
methods, analysing the time series evidence on growth rates in the two countries and 
showing how to combine this with the cross-sectional evidence on comparative levels 
of income and productivity calculated at purchasing power parity. The results of the 
sectoral productivity comparison and the differences in the sectoral distribution of the 
labour force are then presented in section III, while Section IV considers ways of 
cross-checking the results. Section V investigates the long historical roots of India’s 
better comparative performance in services. Although the overall level of investment 
in physical and human capital has been low, India has historically devoted a large 
share of its spending on education to secondary and higher levels. Thus India has 
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produced a small cadre of highly educated workers, who have been employed largely 
in services. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND METHODS FOR ANGLO-INDIAN PRODUCTIVITY 
COMPARISONS 
1. Indian time series 
The starting point for our comparative study is the time series data for India and the 
United Kingdom. For India, we rely largely on the historical national accounts 
reconstructed by Sivasubramonian (2000) for the twentieth century and Heston (1983) 
for the late nineteenth century. The data are generally presented on a fiscal year basis, 
running from 1 April to 31 March, and refer to the boundaries of British India until 
1946/47 and modern India thereafter. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the output 
and employment data for the whole economy and for the three main sectors, 
agriculture, industry and services, together with a detailed listing of sources. It should 
be noted that agriculture includes livestock farming, forestry and fishing as well as 
arable farming, while industry includes mining, construction and the utilities as well 
as manufacturing. Services comprises railways and communications, government 
services, other commerce and transport, professions and liberal arts, domestic service 
and house property.  
 
 The output and employment data from the Appendix can be used to calculate 
indices of labour productivity by major sector. From these indices it is possible to 
calculate the average annual growth rates of labour productivity by sector, which are 
presented here in Table 1. During the late nineteenth century, labour productivity 
growth was fastest in industry, as modern industry developed in India, and slowest in 
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services, despite the modernisation of the transport network. During the first half of 
the twentieth century, although there was respectable labour productivity growth in 
industry and services, labour productivity growth in the economy as a whole was held 
back by stagnation in agriculture. During the second half of the twentieth century, 
respectable labour productivity growth in industry and services has again been offset 
by slow productivity growth in agriculture. 
 
2. UK time series 
The UK time series are taken largely from the historical national accounts of Feinstein 
(1972), updated with output estimates from the UK National Accounts and 
employment data from O’Mahony (2002). Again, the series are presented in the 
Appendix, together with full details of data sources. The territory covered refers to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and the whole of Ireland before 1920, but Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland after 1920. In contrast to Broadberry (1998), where the 
output and employment data were both spliced at 1920, following the procedures of 
Maddison (1995) to provide continuous series within the current boundaries of the 
United Kingdom, in this study both the output and employment series change with the 
secession of southern Ireland, as in Maddison (2003). This does not make a lot of 
difference to the UK data, but is more in line with the procedures of Sivasubramonian 
(2000) for dealing with the major boundary change at the time of Indian 
independence. As in the Indian case, the output and employment series can be 
combined to derive indices of labour productivity, from which the labour productivity 
growth rates shown in Table 1 are calculated.  
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 UK labour productivity growth before World War I was fairly evenly spread 
across the major sectors, but slightly faster in industry than in services or agriculture. 
The period 1920-1950 saw an increase in the labour productivity growth rate in 
industry and agriculture, but stagnation in services. The period after World War II 
saw a further acceleration in the labour productivity growth rate, particularly in 
agriculture and industry. 
 
 Although the periodisation is slightly different for India and the United 
Kingdom in Table 1, due to the different dates of major boundary changes, there are 
indications of some of the major factors behind the differential labour productivity 
growth performance of India and the United Kingdom. First, note that overall labour 
productivity grew faster in Britain than in India before 1970, and faster in India since 
1970. We should thus expect to see India falling further behind Britain until around 
1970 and beginning to catch up thereafter. Second, the largest growth rate 
differentials were in agriculture, so that we can expect to see this sector making a 
large contribution to Indian falling behind. Third, during the period of Indian catching 
up since 1970, although labour productivity growth has been faster in industry than in 
services in both India and Britain, it is only in services that labour productivity growth 
has been higher in India than in Britain. This is in line with the focus of Bosworth and 
Collins (2008) on the key role of services in Indian growth. 
 
3. A benchmark for 1950 
The labour productivity data for India and the United Kingdom from the Appendix 
can be combined to provide trends in comparative labour productivity for each sector 
in index number form. To pin down the comparative labour productivity level, we 
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provide a benchmark estimate for circa 1950, using data on nominal value added per 
employee in each country, compared at sector-specific price ratios, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP). This is necessary because the exchange rate cannot be 
assumed to be a perfect guide to differences in prices between two countries, 
especially at the level of individual goods and services, or particular sectors. For 
example, a country with a comparative advantage in agriculture may expect to have 
relatively cheap food, while a country with a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
may expect to have relatively cheap industrial goods, although we may expect the 
effects of trade to moderate such tendencies. In the case of comparisons between 
developed and less developed countries, moreover, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson 
(1964) have highlighted the tendency of less developed economies to have a lower 
overall price level, due to the presence of non-traded goods and services and the 
availability of low wage labour. 
 
 Table 2 provides an India/UK PPP for agriculture circa 1950, using wholesale 
price data. Whilst it may be argued from a theoretical point of view that it would be 
better to have farm gate prices, this approach runs into the serious problem that the 
major Indian food crop is not grown in Britain, so that no farm gate price exists for 
this product. Since rice was imported into Britain, however, a wholesale price can be 
obtained. Given the importance of rice to the Indian economy, it seems more 
satisfactory to use wholesale prices to capture the availability of cheap food in the 
Indian economy. This is indeed reflected in the fact that at Indian production weights 
the PPP for agriculture is £1 = Rs 10.80, well below the exchange rate of £1 = Rs 
13.36. Using UK production weights, however, gives a much higher weight to 
livestock products such as meat, which were relatively expensive in India, yielding a 
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PPP for agriculture using UK weights of £1 = Rs 16.43. The geometric mean of the 
PPPs for agriculture at Indian and UK weights is £1 = Rs 13.32, which is close to the 
exchange rate. 
 
 Table 3 provides a PPP for industry circa 1950 using factory gate prices from 
production censuses for India and the United Kingdom. Weights reflect shares in 
value added for major industrial categories such as chemicals, metals, etc. while 
within these categories individual products are weighted in line with shares of gross 
output. The industrial PPP of £1 = Rs 11.43 is the geometric mean of Rs 10.52 at 
Indian weights and Rs 12.43 at UK weights, indicating a lower industrial price level 
in India. However, this result depends heavily on the large textiles and clothing sector 
where Indian prices were low, with Indian prices of many other industrial products, 
particularly chemicals, being higher than in Britain.  
 
The validity of the PPP results clearly depends on the accurate matching of 
products and industries between the two countries. In this particular case, it is perhaps 
worth noting that the classification scheme used in the Indian production census was 
modelled very closely on the British census, making the process of matching 
relatively straightforward. Furthermore, in the case of differentiated products, it is 
important to allow only for vertical product differentiation, not horizontal product 
differentiation as a result of differences in tastes. This is generally recognised in the 
classification system, which provides separate information on, for example, different 
types of steel, soap, yarn etc. Given the small scale of the deviation of the PPP from 
the exchange rate compared with the scale of the productivity differences, we can be 
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confident that quality differences do not play a large role in the results. A more 
detailed discussion of this issue is contained in Broadberry (1997: 24-25). 
 
 For services, we have followed Broadberry and Irwin (2007) in using a 
weighted average of the PPPs for agriculture and industry, taking the geometric mean 
of Indian and UK weights. This yields a PPP of £1 = Rs 12.26 for services and also 
for the economy as a whole. Although this indicates a lower price level in India than 
in Britain, the scale of the deviation from purchasing power parity is relatively small 
compared with the differences in more recent times. This apparent absence of a large 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in 1950 is consistent with the empirical findings of Bergin, 
Glick and Taylor (2006), who show the emergence of a significant Balassa-
Samuelson effect amongst a large sample of countries only after the 1950s. 
 
These PPPs can be used in Table 4 to provide a benchmark level of 
comparative labour productivity by sector circa 1950, which can be contrasted with 
the levels obtained using the market exchange rate. Using the sector-specific PPPs 
raises the Indian labour productivity level significantly in industry, services and the 
economy as a whole. For the economy as a whole circa 1950, Indian output per 
worker was less than 10 per cent of the UK level. 
 
III. SECTORAL ASPECTS OF PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
1. Comparative labour productivity levels by sector 
Table 5 provides a breakdown of comparative labour productivity levels by the three 
main sectors of agriculture, industry and services. It is clear that agriculture played a 
key role in India’s falling further behind during the period 1871/73 to 1970/71 and has 
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subsequently slowed down the process of catching-up. In the early 1870s, an average 
Indian agricultural worker produced a bit more than 10 per cent of the output 
produced by an average British agricultural worker. By the 1970s, this had fallen to 
around 2 per cent, and by the 1990s to as little as 1 per cent. In industry, comparative 
labour productivity fluctuated but remained stationary, with Indian labour 
productivity returning to around 15 per cent of the British level. In services, the 
India/UK comparative labour productivity level trended upwards from around 15 per 
cent to around 30 per cent, although the disruption surrounding independence 
interrupted this upward trajectory, providing a setback to services as well as to 
agriculture and industry. 
 
2. The structure of economic activity 
To fully understand the contributions of the three main sectors to comparative 
productivity performance, it is necessary to track their shares in economic activity as 
well as their comparative productivity levels. Table 6 shows the percentage 
distribution of employment by major sectors for selected years. The sectoral 
composition of economic activity was clearly very different in the two countries. 
Compared even with other developed economies, Britain already by the late 
nineteenth century devoted a very small share of the labour force to agriculture. Thus, 
for example, while both Germany and the United States still had around 50 per cent of 
their labour forces tied up in agriculture circa 1870, the United Kingdom had just 22.2 
per cent (Broadberry, 1998: 385). For India, the agricultural share of the labour force 
was around 75 per cent for the century after 1870, and even by the end of the 
twentieth century agriculture still accounted for nearly 65 per cent of Indian 
employment. Given this commitment of resources to an inherently low value added 
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sector, and the poor productivity performance within that sector, it is not difficult to 
understand India’s disappointing overall productivity performance during this period. 
 
 The other striking development in Table 6 is the growing share of employment 
accounted for by services in India, as well as in Britain. During the period of British 
rule in India, this was accompanied by a declining share of industry, but as agriculture 
began to shrink in importance, it became possible for both industry and services to 
expand their shares of employment, particularly after 1970. Again the importance of 
services in Indian productivity performance highlighted by Bosworth and Collins 
(2008) for the current period appears to have its roots in earlier experience. 
 
IV. CROSS-CHECKING THE RESULTS 
A number of recent studies have questioned the use of time series projections from a 
single benchmark over long periods of time, the methodology used here in Table 5. 
Ward and Devereux (2003) suggest that the further one projects from the original 
benchmark, the bigger the discrepancy between time series projections using GDP per 
head in constant prices and cross-sectional benchmarks based on nominal GDP per 
head converted at PPPs, because of index number problems. The issue is the subject 
of debate in Broadberry (2003) and Ward and Devereux (2004). In fact, however, 
Broadberry (1993) had already suggested the use of additional benchmarks to provide 
cross-checks in a study of comparative productivity in manufacturing, while 
Broadberry (1997a; 1997b; 1998; 2006) applied the method to full sectoral 
productivity comparisons over the period 1870-1990 for the United Kingdom with the 
United States and Germany, and found broad agreement between the benchmarks and 
time series evidence for those countries. Broadberry and Irwin (2006; 2007) find 
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similar agreement between time series projections and benchmarks for the United 
Kingdom compared with the United States in the nineteenth century and the United 
Kingdom compared with Australia over the period 1861-1948. 
 
 Dealing with a less developed economy such as India presents greater data 
problems than with relatively rich countries such as the United States and Germany. 
Nevertheless, for the agricultural sector at least, it is possible to collect together a 
number of additional benchmark estimates of comparative India/UK labour 
productivity levels in Table 7. For 1935/36, it is possible to use the same methods as 
for the 1950/51 agricultural benchmark, to arrive at a comparative India/UK labour 
productivity level of 7.5, which is quite consistent with the time series projection of 
7.1. For the period 1970-1990, Prasada Rao (1993) provides benchmark estimates of 
agricultural output per worker every 5 years for many countries, including India and 
the United Kingdom. These estimates suggest that the time series projections are 
broadly tracking the benchmarks.  
 
 For the economy as a whole, we can check the projection of GDP per 
employee from the 1950/51 benchmark in Table 5 against Maddison’s (2003) 
benchmark estimate for 1990. Our time series projection in Table 5 puts Indian GDP 
per employee in 1990 at 11.0 per cent of the UK level. However, to compare with 
Maddison’s benchmark of 8.5 percent, we need to work in terms of GDP per capita 
rather than GDP per employee. Sivasubramonian (2000: 617-620), drawing on the 
work of Visaria (2002), suggests a lower ratio of employment to population in India 
than in Britain, resulting in a time series projection of Indian GDP per capita of 8.8 
per cent of the UK level in 1990, very close to the Maddison benchmark.  
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 For industry, as yet we lack comparable benchmark studies for other years. 
Timmer (1999) has conducted an India/US benchmark comparison for manufacturing 
using Indian price data for 1983/84 and US price data for 1987 projected back to 
1983. Making use of a US/UK benchmark for 1987, it is possible to derive an 
estimate of the India/UK comparative labour productivity level. Apart from the fact 
that this already involves a substantial element of time series projection to a year for 
which we do not have employment data, there are additional adjustments which make 
comparability with the Sivasubramonian (2000) data problematic. Timmer (1999) 
finally reports his results in the form of a benchmark for 1987, reporting Indian labour 
productivity in manufacturing at 16.4 per cent of the UK level for registered firms, but 
only 4.1 per cent for all firms. The former number is broadly consistent with our time 
series projections, while the latter seems difficult to square with the data on GDP per 
head. This suggests that Timmer is including more of the village economy in the 
industrial sector than Sivasubramonian (2000). 
 
Our findings have some implications for the recent debate over the timing of 
the Great Divergence of productivity and living standards between Europe and Asia. 
Although the debate has centred around the claims of Pomeranz (2000) that China 
was as developed as Europe in the late eighteenth century and fell behind only during 
the nineteenth century, similar claims have been made for India by Parthasarathi 
(1998), who argues for slightly higher wages in south India than in England as late as 
the second half of the eighteenth century. This would be very difficult to reconcile 
with Maddison’s (1995; 2003) evidence on comparative GDP per capita, which 
suggests that in 1870, Indian living standards were little more than 15% of the UK 
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level. Because the rate of growth of British per capita income before 1870 has been 
established firmly and was not particularly fast, this would imply an implausibly large 
collapse of Indian living standards during the nineteenth century (Crafts and Harley, 
1992; Deane and Cole, 1962).  
 
One possible way out of this conundrum, suggested by Frank (1988), would be 
to reject the Maddison data in favour of alternative estimates by Bairoch (1981), the 
sources for which were never adequately documented. Bairoch’s (1981) estimates 
show “future developed countries” and “future third world countries” on a par at the 
end of the eighteenth century, and a smaller gap in the second half of the nineteenth 
century than suggested by Maddison. Since both Maddison (2003) and Bairoch (1981) 
obtain their estimates of nineteenth century comparative GDP per capita by projecting 
backwards from a recent benchmark year, using national time series of GDP and 
population for many countries, one way of deciding between the two sets of estimates 
is through consistency with earlier benchmarks and sectoral evidence, following the 
methodology of Broadberry (2003). The benchmark evidence for the India/UK case 
discussed in this section is consistent with the Maddison (2001) projections, and thus 
confirms Broadberry and Gupta’s (2006) case for an early modern Great Divergence.  
 
VI. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SERVICE-LED GROWTH 
1. The contributions of physical and human capital to aggregate performance 
The sectoral analysis suggests that the recent dynamic performance of services is not 
something which suddenly emerged during India’s recent phase of overall catching-
up, but rather has long historical roots. Indeed, India has been catching-up in services 
since the late nineteenth century, and we now investigate the factors behind this early 
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dynamism of India’s service sector and its persistence into the present. We shall 
emphasise a long-standing high share of secondary and higher education in Indian 
educational investment, even at very low levels of development. 
 
 However, to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to place this finding in the 
context of generally low levels of accumulation of both human and physical capital in 
India. In this section, we therefore set out the record of investment in physical and 
human capital in India and the United Kingdom over the period since 1890 in a 
growth accounting framework. Appendix Table A3 provides time series of the non-
residential capital stock in India and the United Kingdom and uses the data to 
calculate total factor input (TFI) and total factor productivity (TFP) in the two 
economies. The Indian data are not available on a sectoral basis, so the estimates are 
provided only for the aggregate economy. The UK capital stock data are taken from 
Feinstein (1972; 1988) for the period before 1950 and from the official national 
accounts for later years. For India, the post-1950 data are from Sivasubramonian 
(2004), while the pre-1950 data are from van Leeuwen (2007), based on the 
investment data of Roy (1996).  
 
To calculate TFP, we derive weights for capital and labour from their 
respective factor shares. For the United Kingdom, the share of capital declined from 
44 per cent before World War I to 35 percent between the wars and 30 per cent after 
World War II (Matthews et al., 1982: 164). For India, the share of capital is only 
available for the post-World War II period from Sivasubramonian (2004: 27-28). 
Since the share of capital in postwar India was relatively high, at 40 percent, we have 
used the same weights for the pre-World War II period. The data in Table 8 suggest 
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low social returns to the growth of the capital stock in colonial India, with no TFP 
growth before 1950. The 1930s were a particularly unproductive period, with 
relatively stagnant output despite substantial growth in the non-residential capital 
stock. India was falling further behind in terms of TFP until 1950, as TFP growth was 
strongly positive in the United Kingdom during this period. The postwar period saw 
positive TFP growth in India, but at a slightly lower rate than in the United Kingdom 
until 1970. Since 1970, TFP growth has accelerated in India and decelerated in the 
United Kingdom, so that India has been catching up in terms of TFP as well as labour 
productivity during this period. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Sivasubramonian (2004) and Bosworth et al. (2007) for postwar India and Matthews 
et al. (1982) for twentieth century Britain. 
 
 Table 9 presents the TFP data on a comparative India/UK basis, with UK=100 
in all years. To do this it is necessary to estimate the comparative level of TFP in 
1950, our benchmark year. The nominal level of capital per employee is compared at 
the PPP for industry. The first column of Table 9 reproduces the comparative labour 
productivity data from Table 5. The second column indicates that India’s capital stock 
per employee has increased from around 5 per cent of the UK level to around 7 per 
cent of the UK level, with most of the increase occurring in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
upshot for comparative TFP levels is shown in the third column. India’s TFP level fell 
substantially relative to the UK level during the period of rapid capital accumulation 
of the 1930s and 1940s, but has grown throughout the postwar period. By the end of 
the twentieth century, however, India was still further behind than during the late 
nineteenth century. At the aggregate level, then, we can conclude that in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, low stocks of physical capital explained 
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much of India’s low level of labour productivity. However, from the end of the 1920s, 
inefficient utilisation of the factors of production explained an increasingly large part 
of India’s poor labour productivity performance.  
 
 Table 10 shows average years of education in the population aged 25 and 
older for India and the United Kingdom. For the period from 1950, the data are taken 
from Barro and Lee (2001). The 1950 levels have been projected to earlier years using 
data on the average years of education of the UK male population aged 15 years and 
older from Matthews et al. (1982) and the average years of education of the Indian 
population aged 15 and over from van Leeuwen (2007). The scale of the human 
capital difference between India and Britain was of the same order of magnitude in 
the late nineteenth century as the physical capital difference. However, during the 
twentieth century, India has closed the human capital gap much more successfully 
than the physical capital gap. 
 
 Finally, the results of this section can be used to place the findings of 
Bosworth and Collins (2008) on India’s recent growth performance in historical 
perspective. They note that at the aggregate level, physical and human capital 
accumulation have contributed relatively little to Indian growth in the period since 
1978. Once again, this finding can be seen to have long historical roots. 
 
2. Human capital and sectoral performance 
We now turn to the contribution of human capital to India’s service sector 
performance. Per capita expenditure on education and the share of education in total 
expenditure was low in British India compared not only to the United Kingdom and 
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other British colonies, but also in comparison to the princely states in India and other 
underdeveloped countries (Chaudhary 2009: 279). However, this mainly affected 
primary education, and the picture was rather different in secondary education. In the 
early twentieth century, Chaudhary (2009: 281) shows that the percentage of the 
population in secondary education was higher in India than in France and Japan, and 
only marginally below England and Wales. Table 11 shows the share of secondary 
and higher education in total government expenditure on education in India, together 
with data for Indonesia and Japan. The data have been put carefully on to a 
comparable basis by van Leeuwen (2007) for a comparative study of human capital 
and economic growth in these three economies. At the aggregate level, van Leeuwen 
(2007) finds that India and Indonesia had relatively low levels of investment in 
education compared with Japan, as would be expected if human capital has a role to 
play in economic development. However, the data in Table 11 also confirm 
Chaudhary’s (2009) finding that the little investment in education occurring in India 
was dramatically skewed towards secondary and higher levels, rather than primary 
education. Indeed, as early as the late nineteenth century, India already exhibits the 
pattern of a developed country in the distribution of resources across the different 
levels of education. If these more highly educated workers were employed 
predominantly in services, then it would help to explain the better labour productivity 
performance of Indian services. 
 
 Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the labour force by level of education in the 
main sectors of the Indian economy in 2001. Clearly, the proportion of workers with 
secondary or higher education is much greater in finance and public administration, 
but the ratio is also very favourable in trade and transport. The only non-service sector 
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with a high share of its labour force educated above primary level is the very small 
utilities sector. The majority of workers in Indian agriculture and the rest of industry 
are illiterate or educated only to primary level. India’s most highly educated workers 
today are thus disproportionately employed in services, the most dynamic sector. We 
now show that this was also the case in the early twentieth century, and provide a 
historical explanation for this elitist system of education.  
 
Although the 1901 census does not allow us to provide a complete breakdown 
of the education levels of workers by sector, it is still possible to demonstrate an 
association between education and services. First, the 1901 census shows that the 
inhabitants of urban areas were far better educated than those of rural areas. Whereas 
259 males and 49 females per thousand could read and write in large towns, the 
corresponding literacy rates for the country as a whole were 98 for males and 7 for 
females. Although the cities were not the only centres of commerce, they were where 
the centres of higher education, seats of government and the law courts were located. 
A second way of demonstrating a link between education and services is through the 
caste system. The statistics of education by religion show that the Parsis were by far 
the most educated group, with nearly three-quarters of males and more than half of 
females able to read and write, giving a figure of almost two-thirds for all Parsis. The 
Jains were the next most highly educated, with 47 per cent of males and 2 per cent of 
females literate, giving a figure of 25 per cent for all Jains. Both these communities 
had a large presence in trade, commerce and modern industry. Evidence from another 
well studied trading community in Bengal also supports this association between 
literacy and commercial services. Drawing on the Census of 1921, Timberg (1978: 
67) shows that among the Marwaris in Calcutta, a trading community that migrated 
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from Western India to Bengal, literacy among the males was as high as in the elite 
castes in Bengal, although very low amongst women. 
 
 The caste system can be seen as playing an important role in these patterns of 
education and sectoral productivity performance. Few occupations required much 
education, and given the hereditary structure of occupation through the caste system, 
education remained confined to the elite castes. The majority of people involved in 
agriculture and cottage industry had little demand for education, as there were no 
incentives of upward mobility. The upper castes had their own schools and when state 
education became a reality in colonial India, they were in a position to exploit the 
system. In states where caste divisions were stronger, the schools catered specifically 
to the upper caste children. Chaudhary (2009:291-296) finds that districts with greater 
caste diversity spent less on primary education and districts with a high share of 
Brahmans (the priestly caste) and other upper castes had a high proportion of 
secondary schools, again suggestive of the high demand for post-primary education 
among the elites. 
 
 Given the economic conditions of the majority of the people and the rigidities 
of the caste system, it is not surprising that education was confined to a small elite of 
occupational groups such as priests, traders and accountants, who worked largely in 
the service sector. Furthermore, the narrow boundaries of caste groups within which a 
demand for education existed ensured that there was a disproportionately high 
demand for secondary education. 
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 It is clear, then, that the elites had a strong preference for secondary and higher 
education. However, it should also be noted that within the elites, the trading castes 
had similar preferences to the Brahmans, the group usually considered to have had the 
highest demand for education. Table 12 examines the caste-level literacy figures by 
province for 1901. The figures in bold give the literacy rates for all castes in the 
province, while the other figures give the rates for the elite priestly, warrior and 
trading castes. The caste hierarchy differed across regions, with different castes 
dominant in trade, commerce and other services in different provinces. In all 
provinces, the trading castes and others involved in services shared similar levels of 
literacy as the Brahmans. Indeed, in some provinces, such as Bengal, Bombay and 
Madras, the castes engaged in trade and commerce had significantly higher levels of 
literacy than the Brahmans. Table 12 thus suggests that the high levels of education 
found in the Indian service sector today date back at least to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
 
 We have focused here on education by caste to explain high productivity in 
Indian services. However, there may be additional links between the caste system and 
service sector productivity. Kumar (1987: 393) ends an interesting article on services 
in Madras Presidency in the first half of the nineteenth century with the question: “is 
it indeed the case that in India services were performed outside the family by 
specialists, to a much larger extent than in other comparable societies and if so, does 
the caste system provide an explanation?” A game-theoretic interpretation of the caste 
system as a means of contract enforcement by Freitas (2007) appears to answer this 
question in the affirmative. First, a high degree of occupational specialisation is seen 
as resulting from an enforcement strategy which involves the denial of a service by a 
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monopoly supplier. Second, a high degree of reliance on the provision of services 
outside the family even at low levels of development results from the purity system, 
which bolsters the monopoly position of suppliers. 
 
A number of other studies also provide a favourable interpretation of 
community networks based on the caste system solving informational problems which 
are particularly prevalent in commercial services (Timberg and Aiyar, 1980; Timberg, 
1978; Rudner, 1994; Gupta, 2008). Here, however, it is important to emphasise that 
we are seeking to explain the relatively better performance of Indian services within 
an overall context of low productivity compared with other countries. Indeed, Wolcott 
(2008) points to negative effects of the caste system in industry, attributing the very 
high propensity to strike among Indian textile workers to social norms of mutual 
support established through caste networks. Again, this helps to understand the 
relative performance of Indian services and industry. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides a sectoral analysis of comparative India/UK labour productivity 
performance over the period 1870-2000. Between 1870 and 1970, output per worker 
in India fell from around 15 per cent of the UK level in the economy as a whole to 
less than 10 per cent, as India fell further behind. Since the 1970s, India has begun to 
catch-up on the United Kingdom, but by the end of the twentieth century, was still 
further behind than in the early 1870s. This disappointing Indian productivity 
performance is largely due to the agricultural sector. This is the only sector where 
India has continued to fall further and further behind, with labour productivity at the 
end of the twentieth century around 1 per cent of the UK level. Although there have 
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been fluctuations in comparative India/UK productivity in industry, there has been no 
trend, with India at around 15 per cent of the UK level in the late nineteenth and late 
twentieth centuries. Only in services has there been an upward trend in comparative 
India/UK labour productivity. The recent emergence of a dynamic service-led Indian 
economy thus has long historical roots. Although overall levels of investment in 
human capital have been low in India, there has been a long-standing bias towards 
secondary and higher education, and these educated workers have been employed 
largely in services, where their productivity has been relatively high. 
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TABLE 1: Average annual growth rates of output per employee (% per year) 
 
A. India 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1872/73 to 1900/01 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.4 
1900/01 to 1946/47 0.0 1.4 1.0 0.5 
1950/51 to 1970/71 0.9 3.4 2.8 1.9 
1970-71 to 1999/00 0.9 2.7 2.3 2.5 
 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1871 to 1911 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 
1920 to 1950 1.7 2.3 0.1 1.1 
1950 to 1970 5.2 2.6 1.5 2.1 
1970 to 1999 3.6 3.0 1.0 1.7 
 
Source: Derived from Appendix Tables A1, A2. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: An India/UK PPP for agriculture, 1950/51 
 
 PPP 
(Rs per £) 
Indian 
weights (%) 
UK weights 
(%) 
Wheat 16.12 15.1 14.2 
Rice 6.97 52.9  
Barley 10.37 3.5 13.2 
Tea 12.38 3.5  
Coffee 7.68 0.3  
Sugar 19.33 14.9 15.2 
Mutton 17.78 1.6 50.5 
Cotton 7.15 4.7  
Wool 12.59 0.2 6.6 
Silk 20.41 0.3  
Jute 9.46 2.5  
Hides 8.07 0.5 0.3 
Total agriculture 13.32 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Indian prices: Central Statistical Organisation (1953: Table 121); UK prices: 
Editor of “The Statist” (1951); Indian weights: derived from Sivasubramonian (2000: 
Table 3.23, Appendix Table 3(c)); UK weights: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (1968); Ojala (1952: 208). 
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TABLE 3: An India/UK PPP for industry, 1950/51 
 
 PPP 
(Rs per £) 
Indian 
weights (%) 
UK weights 
(%) 
Chemicals & allied 20.98 8.8 7.2 
Metals & engineering 11.66 20.6 46.9 
Textiles & clothing 6.99 54.3 17.9 
Food, drink & tobacco 15.43 11.0 10.7 
Other industry 14.71 5.3 17.3 
Total industry 11.43 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Indian prices and weights: Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1954); UK 
prices and weights: Board of Trade (1956). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Comparative India/UK GDP per employee by sector, 1950/51 
 
A. Compared at exchange rate 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
India (Rs) 421 833 997 556 
UK (£) 587 498 466 487 
Exchange rate (Rs per £) 13.36 13.36 13.36 13.36 
India/UK (UK=100) 5.4 12.5 16.0 8.5 
 
 
B. Compared at sectoral PPPs 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
India (Rs) 421 833 997 556 
UK (£) 587 498 466 487 
PPP (Rs per £) 13.32 11.43 12.26 12.26 
India/UK (UK=100) 5.4 14.6 17.5 9.3 
 
Sources: Nominal GDP: India: Sivasubramonian (2000: Table 6.9, Appendix Table 
8(a)); UK: Mitchell (1988: 824); Employment: India: Sivasubramonian (2000: Tables 
2.11, 9.32); UK: Feinstein (1972: Table 59); Market exchange rate: Central Statistical 
Organisation (1953: Table 101); PPPs: Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
TABLE 5: Comparative India/UK labour productivity by sector (UK=100) 
 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1871/73 11.2 18.2 18.1 15.0 
1881/83 11.3 16.8 15.9 14.1 
1890/91 10.4 17.3 15.6 13.8 
1900/01 10.5 18.6 15.6 13.2 
1910/11 11.1 24.2 17.7 14.4 
1920/21 9.8 21.1 21.1 13.4 
1929/30 8.3 25.3 25.2 14.2 
1935/36 7.1 21.8 23.2 12.8 
1946/48 7.0 18.1 23.5 11.7 
1950/51 *5.4 *14.6 *17.5 *9.3 
1960/61 4.3 16.4 20.0 9.7 
1970/71 2.3 17.3 22.6 8.9 
1980/81 1.6 16.1 29.3 10.2 
1990/91 0.9 18.3 33.0 11.0 
1999/00 1.0 15.8 32.8 11.4 
 
Source: Derived from Appendix Tables A1, A2. 
Note: * indicates benchmark year for time series projections. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Labour force by sector (%) 
 
A. India 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
1875 73.4 14.5 12.1 
1910/11 75.5 10.3 14.2 
1929/30 76.1 9.1 14.8 
1950/51 73.6 10.2 16.2 
1970/71 73.8 11.1 15.1 
1999/00 64.2 13.9 21.9 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
1871 22.2 42.4 35.4 
1911 11.8 44.1 44.1 
1929 7.5 44.2 48.3 
1950 6.8 43.5 49.7 
1970 3.5 42.9 53.6 
2000 1.9 22.9 75.2 
 
Sources: India: derived from Sivasubramonian (2000); UK: derived from Feinstein 
(1972) and O’Mahony (2002). 
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TABLE 7: Benchmarks and time series projections in agriculture 
 
 Time series 
projection 
PPP 
benchmarks 
1935/36 7.1 7.5 
1950/51 *5.4 5.4 
1970/71 2.3 2.3 
1980/81 1.7 2.0 
1990/91 0.9 1.8 
 
Sources: Time series projection: Table 5; PPP benchmarks: 1935/36: using same 
method as Table 2, based on Indian data from Secretary of State for India (1939: 
Table 171) and UK data from Board of Trade (1939: Table 192); 1950/51: Table 4; 
1970/71, 1980/81 and 1990/91: Prasada Rao (1993: Table 5.9). 
Note: * indicates benchmark year for time series projections. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: Growth rates of TFP (% per year) 
 
 India  UK 
1890/91 to 1900/01 -0.8 1891 to 1911 0.3 
1900/01 to 1946/47 -0.1 1920 to 1950 1.0 
1950/51 to 1970/71 1.0 1950 to 1970 1.3 
1970/71 to 1999/00 1.3 1970 to 1999 0.9 
 
Source: Derived from Appendix Table A3.  
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TABLE 9: India/UK comparative TFP (UK=100) 
 
 Comparative 
Y/L 
Comparative 
K/L 
Comparative 
TFP 
1890/91 13.8 4.3 41.9 
1900/01 13.2 5.2 37.4 
1910/11 14.4 4.3 44.0 
1920/21 13.4 4.1 42.6 
1929/30 14.2 4.5 43.2 
1935/36 12.8 5.2 36.9 
1946/48 11.7 7.0 29.9 
1950/51 *9.3 *7.1 *23.5 
1960/61 9.7 6.7 24.7 
1970/71 8.9 6.1 22.7 
1980/81 10.2 6.7 24.2 
1990/91 11.0 6.9 25.3 
1999/00 11.4 6.9 25.4 
 
Source: Derived from Appendix Table A3. 
Note: * indicates benchmark year for time series projections. 
 
TABLE 10: Average years of education in the population aged 25 and older 
 
 India United 
Kingdom 
1890/91 0.20 4.23 
1910/11 0.37 5.36 
1929/30 0.64 6.47 
1950/51 1.20 7.32 
1970/71 1.90 7.66 
1990/91 3.68 8.74 
1999/00 4.77 9.35 
 
Sources: Barro and Lee (2001: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html); van 
Leeuwen (2007: Table A.7.1); Matthews et al. (1982: 573). 
 
 
 
TABLE 11: Share of secondary and higher education in total government 
expenditure on education (%) 
 
 India Indonesia Japan 
1890 61.2 18.8 14.8 
1910 62.3 18.5 24.2 
1930 59.5 21.4 30.8 
1950 57.3 28.2 59.6 
1970 75.5 36.2 62.9 
1990 56.9 58.8 66.9 
 
Source: van Leeuwen (2007: 276-284). 
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TABLE 12: Literacy rates per 1,000 by caste in Indian states, 1901 
 
 Males Females   Males Females 
Assam 67 4 
 United 
Provinces of 
Agra and 
Oudh 57 2 
Brahman 517 27  Kayastha 553 46 
Kayastha 471 56  Barhai 17 1 
    Lohar 17 1 
Bengal 104 5  Baroda state 163 8 
Baidya 648 259 
 Chatidraseni 
(Kayastha 
Prabhu) 744 88 
Kayastha 560 66 
 Brahman 
(Maharashtra) 730 56 
Brahman 467 26  Vania 631 18 
   
 Brahman 
(Gujurat) 429 17 
Berar 85 3 
 Central 
India 
Agency 55 3 
Brahman 595 47  Maratha 231 10 
Wani 530 8  Brahman 183 3 
Pathan 104 7     
Bombay 116 9  Cochin State 224 45 
Vani 
(Gujurat) 776 158 
 Brahman 
(Malayali) 695 227 
Prabhu 474 177 
 Kshatriya 
(Malayali) 615 319 
Brahman 580 54     
Burma 378 45  Mysore State 93 8 
Burmese 490 55  Brahman 681 64 
Talaing 357 62  Digambara 410 21 
Karen 143 37  Panchala 177 4 
Central 
Provinces 54 2 
 Travancore 
State 215 31 
Bania 446 11 
 Brahman 
(Malayali) 663 191 
Brahman 365 9  Ambalavasi 576 156 
Sonar 215 4     
Madras 119 9     
Eurasian 729 710     
Brahman 578 44     
Native 
Christian 162 59 
    
 
Source: Risley and Gait (1903), Report on the Census of India, 1901. 
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FIGURE 1: Educations levels of employees in India by sector, 2001 (%) 
 
 
 
Source: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner (2001), Census of 
India, 2001. 
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APPENDIX: DATA AND SOURCES FOR TIME SERIES PROJECTIONS  
 
TABLE A1: Time series for Indian output, employment and labour productivity 
by sector (1950=100) 
 
A. Indian output 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1872/73 74.9 34.0 51.6 61.1 
1882/83 80.9 36.0 51.1 64.4 
1890/91 92.6 42.9 55.9 73.5 
1900/01 94.4 52.0 58.3 76.7 
1910/11 113.0 72.2 74.0 94.7 
1920/21 96.8 57.3 86.1 87.4 
1929/30 113.9 92.6 109.2 109.1 
1935/36 113.0 99.1 111.8 110.4 
1946/47 115.4 110.6 120.5 116.1 
1950/51 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960/61 136.3 181.9 148.0 147.1 
1970/71 170.7 308.5 232.2 211.2 
1980/81 199.8 456.9 351.6 286.7 
1990/91 205.8 920.6 643.2 494.0 
1999/00 356.9 1,589.8 1,230.2 819.1 
 
 
B. Indian employment 
 Agriculture Industry Services Total 
1872/73 74.1 76.5 64.5 72.7 
1882/83 75.5 77.6 66.0 74.1 
1890/91 81.2 83.7 71.0 79.7 
1900/01 82.8 85.5 72.2 81.3 
1910/11 88.6 87.8 75.5 86.4 
1920/21 88.8 79.9 72.9 85.2 
1929/30 88.9 76.9 78.4 86.0 
1935/36 90.4 83.4 84.4 88.7 
1946/47 99.5 96.5 92.1 97.9 
1950/51 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960/61 115.6 129.5 114.2 116.7 
1970/71 143.6 156.2 134.0 143.3 
1980/81 146.9 203.2 152.2 153.5 
1990/91 184.9 243.5 218.6 196.1 
1999/00 233.7 365.2 363.5 268.0 
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C. Indian output per employee 
 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1872/73 101.1 44.4 80.0 84.0 
1882/83 107.2 46.4 77.4 87.0 
1890/91 114.1 51.2 78.7 92.2 
1900/01 114.1 60.8 80.8 94.3 
1910/11 127.5 82.3 98.1 109.5 
1920/21 109.0 71.7 118.1 102.5 
1929/30 128.1 120.4 139.2 126.8 
1935/36 125.0 118.8 132.5 124.4 
1946/47 116.0 114.6 130.9 118.6 
1950/51 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960/61 117.9 140.4 129.6 126.1 
1970/71 118.9 197.6 173.2 147.4 
1980/81 136.0 224.8 231.0 186.8 
1990/91 111.3 378.1 294.3 251.9 
1999/00 152.7 435.4 338.5 305.6 
 
Sources 
Output by sector 
1868/69 to 1900/01: Heston (1983: 397). Note that Heston provides data only for 
services plus small-scale industry. Small-scale industry is calculated for the 
pre-19000 period as the 1900-01 share (36%). The share remained at about 
this level until WWI, then dropped to around 30%, where it remained for the 
interwar period. The total of small-scale industry and services also grew only 
very slowly during this period, at 0.5% per annum.  
1900/01 to 1946/47: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 6.11). 
1946/47 to 1999/2000: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 8b). 
 
Employment by sector 
1868/69 to 1900/01: Heston (1983: 396). The 1900-01 employment data from 
Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 2.11) were used to determine the breakdown 
between agriculture, industry and services. The Heston (1983: 394, 396) data 
were used to establish the constancy of sectoral shares before 1900. 
1900/01 to 1946/47: Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 2.11). 
1946/47 to 1999/2000: Derived from Sivasubramonium (2000: Table 9.32). 
 
Territory 
Boundaries of British India before 1946/47, modern India thereafter. 
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TABLE A2: UK time series for output, employment and labour productivity by 
sector (1950=100) 
 
A. UK output 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1871 96.8 20.9 33.1 31.3 
1881 92.8 25.7 42.1 37.1 
1891 98.8 30.8 51.7 44.4 
1901 90.3 38.6 62.8 53.3 
1911 94.2 44.0 75.0 61.9 
1920 66.4 47.1 75.0 61.8 
1929 79.5 60.4 80.3 71.1 
1935 82.2 67.9 86.0 77.6 
1948 90.9 89.4 98.2 93.1 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960 126.1 135.4 122.5 128.5 
1970 159.9 178.6 157.0 167.0 
1980 209.1 191.0 190.9 192.4 
1990 260.6 225.7 254.8 248.4 
1999 265.0 248.9 322.1 294.9 
 
 
B. UK employment 
 Agriculture Industry Services Total 
1871 197.8 58.8 42.8 60.2 
1881 181.3 63.7 49.4 64.5 
1891 166.8 71.5 58.3 71.4 
1901 153.4 80.8 69.5 80.0 
1911 152.2 88.5 77.5 87.4 
1920 110.4 95.1 76.8 87.0 
1929 95.2 86.8 83.0 85.5 
1935 86.9 85.3 86.2 85.9 
1948 101.4 96.9 100.7 99.0 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960 85.6 108.4 108.2 106.8 
1970 56.9 107.3 117.3 108.8 
1980 46.5 93.9 138.6 112.9 
1990 40.4 75.0 163.2 116.5 
1999 33.3 62.0 178.5 117.9 
 
 
 35 
C. UK output per employee 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
1871 48.9 35.6 77.4 52.0 
1881 51.2 40.3 85.3 57.5 
1891 59.3 43.1 88.6 62.2 
1901 58.9 47.8 90.5 66.6 
1911 61.9 49.7 96.8 70.9 
1920 60.1 49.5 97.8 71.1 
1929 83.5 69.5 96.7 83.2 
1935 94.6 79.6 99.7 90.4 
1948 89.7 92.3 97.4 94.1 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960 147.2 124.9 113.2 120.4 
1970 281.2 166.5 133.9 153.5 
1980 449.8 203.4 137.7 170.4 
1990 645.3 300.9 156.2 213.2 
1999 795.1 401.7 180.4 250.0 
 
 
 
Sources 
Output by sector 
1871-1965: Feinstein (1972: Table 8). Weights for component parts of service sector 
from Feinstein (1972: 208). 
1965-2000: UK National Statistics (various years), UK National Accounts. 
 
Employment by sector 
1871-1938: Feinstein (1972: Tables 59, 60). 
1948-1999: O'Mahony (2002), projected back from 1950 to 1948 using Feinstein 
(1972: Table 59). 
 
Territory 
Boundaries of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland before 1920, Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland after 1920. 
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TABLE A3: Aggregate time series for capital stock and total factor productivity 
(1950=100) 
 
A.India 
 GDP Employment Capital TFI TFP 
1890/91 73.5 79.7 29.1 53.3 138.0 
1900/01 76.7 81.3 38.7 60.4 127.0 
1910/11 94.7 86.4 39.1 62.9 150.5 
1920/21 87.4 85.2 41.6 64.0 136.5 
1929/30 109.1 86.0 51.7 70.1 155.5 
1935/36 110.4 88.7 64.3 78.0 141.4 
1946/47 116.1 97.9 93.2 96.0 121.0 
1950/51 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960/61 147.1 116.7 130.6 122.1 120.5 
1970/71 211.2 143.3 218.3 169.6 124.6 
1980/81 286.7 153.5 344.6 212.1 135.2 
1990/91 494.0 196.1 556.1 297.6 166.0 
1999/00 819.1 268.0 971.2 448.6 182.6 
 
B. UK  
 GDP Employment Capital TFI TFP 
1891 44.4 71.4 42.6 57.3 77.5 
1901 53.3 80.0 52.2 66.8 79.8 
1911 61.9 87.4 64.5 77.0 80.3 
1920 61.8 87.0 73.1 82.1 75.3 
1929 71.1 85.5 80.6 84.0 84.6 
1935 77.6 85.9 85.6 86.0 90.2 
1948 93.1 99.0 95.8 98.0 95.0 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1960 128.5 106.8 126.2 112.2 114.5 
1970 167.0 108.8 194.2 129.4 129.0 
1980 192.4 112.9 269.4 146.5 131.2 
1990 248.4 116.5 342.2 160.9 154.3 
1999 294.9 117.9 436.7 174.6 168.8 
 
 
Sources for gross fixed non-residential capital stock: 
India 
1890/91 to 1950/51: van Leeuwen (2007: Table A.2), derived from Roy (1996). The 
capital stock in 1950/51 was reduced  to 82.7 per cent of van Leeuwen’s level 
in line with population, to take account of lower population in modern India 
compared with colonial India. 
1950/51 to 1999/00: Sivasubramonian (2004: Table 4.4). 
 
United Kingdom 
1871-1920: Feinstein (1988: Table XI). 
1920-1965: Feinstein (1972: Table 44). 
1965-1996: UK National Statistics (various years), UK National Accounts. 
1996-1999: O’Mahony (2002). 
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